Despite the obvious commonalities between the two groups, the atheist movement has always had a rather strained relationship with the more generalized skeptical movement. In part this is the fault of organized atheism, as many atheists endorse mystical crap like acupuncture and other alternative medicines while pretending to be reasonable just because they reject religion. However, the real schism between the two groups is a result of the unfounded idea that atheism, at least in some forms, is not sufficiently scientific. Those skeptical movements that disassociate themselves from atheism tend to see atheism as a philosophical outlook rather than a scientific or empirically justified stance. The arguments in support of this claim, though, tend to be rather unconvincing.
Most forms of atheism address conceptions of God that are explicitly amenable to scientific tests. The bulk of religious believers, for instance, do not believe in obscure deistic entities that never interact in the physical world. They believe in a God that can manifest itself as a human being, perform miracles, heal sickness, control the vocal cords of those filled with the holy spirit (though God seems to take some perverse joy out of using those vocal cords just to speak in jibberish), and so on. Even those deities that are a bit more remote and do not perform miracles of this sort are nevertheless testable, as they are said to be creators of the universe and to have placed humanity on top of some sort of cosmic hierarchy of importance. These are all characteristics that yield testable hypotheses, and when our observations do not support these hypotheses, we have scientific grounds for rejecting these religious claims. When we see that humanity is the product of random forces whose existence is not probable, much less logically necessary, that throws serious doubt on any conceptions of God who created the universe with humanity as its pinnacle achievement.
In that sense, then, atheism is indeed scientific. Most forms of God can be ruled out on a purely evidentiary basis, in much the same way a scientist would rule out similar scientific hypotheses in other fields. This is generally accepted, even among those skeptics who feel atheism is a philosophical stance rather than a scientific one. The problem, naturally, is that some forms of God cannot be ruled out in this manner. These versions of God are so remote and deistic that they yield no testable predictions or observations of any sort, and thus, the skeptics would argue, they are not susceptible to scientific investigation. Massimo Pigliucci recently made an argument of this sort in a blog post titled “On the Scope of Skeptical Inquiry“.
Pigliucci acknowledges that some religious claims about God are scientifically testable, but in the end maintains that atheism is primarily a philosophical position because it addresses claims that can’t be assessed scientifically through the process of observation. One of the examples he gives is the claim by some creationists that God designed the world to look as if it were billions of years old when it is in fact only 6,000 years old. No evidence could contradict this kind of statement, obviously, and as such Pigliucci claims that it can only be assessed on philosophical, not scientific, grounds.
The problem, of course, is that this could extend to any realm of inquiry traditionally seen as within the scope of skeptical inquiry. If believers in cryptofauna like bigfoot and Nessie protected their claims from inquiry by saying, such as they do, that we would not expect to see evidence of their existence even if we looked, clearly we cannot scientifically address such a claim. Nevertheless, no skeptical organization is thus busy rewriting its mission statement to exclude cryptozoological investigations from its scope of inquiry; atheism, on the other hand, is singled out for just this reason. If the basis for rejecting atheism as a form of scientific skepticism rests on the unfalsifiability of religious claims, then any other field of skeptical inquiry is open to the same sort of criticism, as those who believe in alternative medicine, creationism, psychic powers, and ghosts frequently make claims that are unfalsifiable.
With that said, the other problematic aspect of rejecting religion as a field of skeptical inquiry concerns the overly narrow conception of “science” endorsed by such skeptics. Science isn’t just a process of simple falsification of claims. It is much more nuanced and much scientific activity is philosophical. Pigliucci tries to differentiate science from philosophy in noting that scientific knowledge seems to progress whereas philosophical knowledge seems to stagnate on the same unanswered questions. This is an uncharitable characterization of philosophy, though. Science itself is one of the ultimate successes of the progress of philosophy! The early Greek philosophers weren’t simply asking questions about souls and free will, but were addressing questions of the natural sciences. The scientific method is merely an epistemological and philosophical framework. The reason philosophy doesn’t seem to progress isn’t because it is not successful, but because when it is successful it becomes renamed as science!
So, in a sense, the demarcation between science and philosophy is not clear. Nevertheless, even if we accept the demarcation, it is clear that scientists do entertain and reject untestable hypotheses all the time. Science isn’t simply a matter of testing reality against observation, but it also puts into practice epistemological principles like Ockham’s razor. For example, basic philosophy of science shows that theories are always underdetermined by the data. That is, for any set of data, an unlimited number of potential explanations exist that would also fit the data. Evolution explains the data we see for the origin of human beings, for instance, but so does a hypothesis stating that the universe and human beings popped into existence two seconds ago with only the appearance of age. Scientists reject all the other potential explanations, even though they can cohere with scientific observations, because they are untestable or not parsimonious. Notice that scientists do not reject these alternative explanations after observing evidence that the additional elements of these hypotheses do not exist! They are rejected for epistemological, and hence philosophical, reasons. In this case the principle of rejecting untestable claims serves as a check against the tendency of human beings to make mistakes and err. The more you assume, the more likely you are to be wrong, and thus scientists assume the least that is justified by the evidence. As can be seen, the principle of parsimony is essential to science, because it cuts through problems of underdetermination by requiring evidence for additional explanatory entities. As such, scientists do not claim the origin of humanity is not within the scope of skeptical inquiry merely because untestable hypotheses can be generated to “explain” our origin. Scientific inquiry is not so constrained or feeble and frail that it cannot overcome untestable hypotheses. This includes untestable hypotheses of a religious nature.
In short, the attempt to form ghettos of critical inquiry that exclude atheism from skepticism are misguided. It would be as misguided as randomly excluding cryptozoology or alternative medicine merely because their supporters also make untestable claims. Scientific analysis is always dealing with untestable claims. Any theory accepted by scientists entails the rejection of countless untestable claims compatible with the underdetermined data set. As such, rejecting untestable claims, whether they be religious in nature or not, is thoroughly scientific. For the skeptical community to attempt singling out atheism for this reason thus seems silly and disheartening, especially knowing that it is likely motivated by the unfounded respect (which entails a lack of criticism) traditionally accorded to the religious. I suspect that had we evolved in a parallel universe where cryptozoology was the reigning belief system, and we were all socialized to respect claims about Bigfoot and never criticize them, then we’d be seeing skeptical movements decrying the inclusion of cryptozoology within its scope. Luckily, we do not live in that universe. And hopefully we can change our current universe from one in which the skeptical community attempts to exclude atheism to one in which skepticism of religion is just as acceptable as any other area of inquiry..
12 comments
UnBeguiled
29 October, 2009 at 6:54 AM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
“the claim by some creationists that God designed the world to look as if it were billions of years old when it is in fact only 6,000 years old.”
Which would contradict the usual theistic assertion that God is truthful. But am I being a scientist or a philosopher by pointing that out? Who cares.
I had this conversation with Matt Dillahunty (gratuitous name drop) recently. This is what I wrote:
There are 3 issues here:
1. Can a skeptic be a theist?
2. Should skepticism as a movement address religious claims?
3. Is there a schism in the movement concerning #2?
In reverse order. The issue has not yet caused a schism. People argue about it, but I see no evidence for an immanent fracturing of the movement.
Concerning number 2. It seems to me to even ask the question goes counter to the basic principles of skepticism. No claims should be off the table of criticism and investigation. I suppose a political and strategic argument could be made, but in my view you would then be subordinating science, reason, and evidence to politics – which to me is idiotic.
Finally, can a skeptic be a theist? Certainly. A skeptic is a person committed to a method, not a person who accepts or rejects some laundry list of claims. A skeptic accepts claims that are in her view likely to be true based on testable hypothesis and critical thinking. We have both interacted with people who, like us, are committed to the principles of skepticism, yet reach a different conclusion about a particular issue. To say that all theists are thereby “not good skeptics” is to commit the no-true Scotsman fallacy.
In a situation where I disagree with another skeptic, I conclude that though the person is a committed skeptic, she has simply made an error in evaluating the evidence or in critical thinking. Realizing of course that she thinks the same of me.
Saint Gasoline
1 November, 2009 at 9:37 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
Unbeguiled, I agree that a theist can tentatively be called a skeptic provided he demonstrates scientific capacities in most other important skeptical areas. But in that sense, so can someone who buys into 9/11 conspiracies, or who practices alternative medicine and rallies against vaccines. I don’t think someone who believed vaccines caused autism would be given the same deference as a religious believer often gets in the skeptical community, and I think that has to change.
Is committment to the scientific method enough to be a skeptic? Many people understand the scientific method and claim to be committed to it yet are creationists or purveyors of medical woo. In the end I think that what you ultimately do believe has to come into play in some fashion when identifying someoen as a skeptic, otherwise there’s the possibility that a few “skeptics” will believe a wide assortment of ridiculous things, and we’d have to conclude that they are committed skeptics but just made an error in evaluating the evidence, realizing that they think the same of me. I’m more comfortable saying a skeptic is someone who is committed to the scientific method and who accepts a large portion of the generalized skeptical views concerning a laundry list of topics from religion to alternative medicine.
Flavin
29 October, 2009 at 3:09 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
“Despite the obvious commonalities between the two groups, the atheist movement has always had a rather strained relationship with the more generalized skeptical movement. In part this is the fault of organized atheism, as many atheists endorse mystical crap like acupuncture and other alternative medicines while pretending to be reasonable just because they reject religion. However, the real schism between the two groups is a result of the unfounded idea that atheism, at least in some forms, is not sufficiently scientific. Those skeptical movements that disassociate themselves from atheism tend to see atheism as a philosophical outlook rather than a scientific or empirically justified stance. ”
Citation needed for every sentence in this passage. You have not sufficiently demonstrated that the problem you’re commenting on actually exists.
Saint Gasoline
1 November, 2009 at 9:29 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
Flavin, I’ve linked to someone arguing that position within the post. Many skeptical organizations are well-known for distancing themselves from atheism or else insisting that one need not be an atheist to be a skeptic. The New England Skeptical Society is a well-known example, and so is the James Randi Educational Forum. The host of TAM7 was Hal Bidlack, a theist. Now, I wouldn’t necessarily say atheism is a necessary condition for being a skeptic, but it should be one of the more heavily weighted categories of skepticism when identifying skeptics. For instance, someone who believes in religion, alternative medicine, UFOs, but doubts the existence of bigfoot is clearly not a scientific skeptic, even if he claims to be “scientific”. Someone who is theistic but doubts all the other standard skeptical fare is a borderline case.
But imagine if the host of TAM7 had been, instead a theist, a supporter of alternative medicine or an antivaccinationist. I highly doubt anyone would then be insisting as thoroughly that these views are acceptable for a skeptic. It just seems to me that the outdated idea that we must respect religion has extended into skeptical inquiry—and thus it should be immediately stamped out.
Mike
2 November, 2009 at 7:30 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
I agree with you that someone’s religious beliefs should matter in determining whether they are a skeptic. Even if they adopt some sort of vague theism, they’re still going against Ockham’s razor. But how far does this go? Should we similarly say that people who believe in contra-causal free will, Platonic realism, or intrinsic moral values are not true skeptics? I think it would be silly to call a Young Earth creationist a skeptic regardless of what else he believed, but is vague theism or deism really worse than those other beliefs I mentioned? I’m not sure what the right answer is, but I think we should make sure that we don’t treat certain beliefs less skeptically just because they are more common among skeptics.
Flavin
2 November, 2009 at 10:30 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
I think my first comment was mostly chastising you for loose language. Even given Pigliucci’s post, I think your above quoted statements are not adequately supported. I think he is not claiming that skeptical groups should not be disentangle themselves from philosophical/religious topics. I do not see him advocating (in this post) that if a group styles itself as a “skeptical” group it cannot address a topic in philosophy/politics. How I read the article is that when topics “outside” scientific skepticism are addressed, a distinction should be made between the use of the tools of scientific skepticism and the tools of philosophy. Speaking very specifically about Pigliucci and his particular blog post to which you linked (which, to be fair, is all the evidence you had provided when I made my first comment) he has made no “attempt to form ghettos of critical inquiry that exclude atheism from skepticism.”
Where I think your argument has more merit is in regards to something you mentioned in your comment response. “Many skeptical organizations are well-known for distancing themselves from atheism or else insisting that one need not be an atheist to be a skeptic. The New England Skeptical Society is a well-known example, and so is the James Randi Educational Forum.” I think you didn’t treat this topic fully enough in the original post, but it is an idea with which I agree.
After making reference to the creationist who invokes the “God made the Earth look old” argument, you continue, “The problem, of course, is that this could extend to any realm of inquiry traditionally seen as within the scope of skeptical inquiry. If believers in cryptofauna like bigfoot and Nessie protected their claims from inquiry by saying, such as they do, that we would not expect to see evidence of their existence even if we looked, clearly we cannot scientifically address such a claim. Nevertheless, no skeptical organization is thus busy rewriting its mission statement to exclude cryptozoological investigations from its scope of inquiry; atheism, on the other hand, is singled out for just this reason.”
I think, taking the example of the NESS, they regularly address and demolish unfalsifiable ideas. One that has become a running gag on their podcast is “psychic bigfoot.” They have mocked this idea and obviously consider it worthy of ridicule—rightly so—but what marks psychic bigfoot as so different from god, an idea they have defined as beyond their scope?
So… yeah. I guess you are right about that. Don’t let it go to your head because now I’ve got to fucking slam you.
————————–
UnB says, “In a situation where I disagree with another skeptic, I conclude that though the person is a committed skeptic, she has simply made an error in evaluating the evidence or in critical thinking.”
You respond, “I agree that a theist can tentatively be called a skeptic provided he demonstrates scientific capacities in most other important skeptical areas. But in that sense, so can someone who buys into 9/11 conspiracies, or who practices alternative medicine and rallies against vaccines.”
So so very false analogy. While I think your main point—that one’s position on theism does matter to ones skeptical identity and that simply because a group is about “skepticism” it must not restrict itself from religious claims—has been supported, I cannot allow you to slip in this whopper without calling you out.
There is a difference between being a certain kind of theist (read, “choosing to not accept the religious null hypothesis in the absence of contradictory evidence for some wishy-washy faith”) and being a truther or an antivaxxer (read, “actively contradicting facts and evidence in support of an ideology”). At best this argument is lazy, and at worst you’re equivocating by shifting the definition of “theist” from one side of the science-accepting spectrum to the other.
Saint Gasoline
2 November, 2009 at 11:29 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
Flavin, Pigliucci’s post isn’t titled “On the Scope of Skeptical Inquiry” for no reason! He is indeed arguing that there should be ghettos of skeptical inquiry, and that atheism should be excluded when it addresses unfalsifiable claims about God. Skeptical inquiry doesn’t extend that far, so he says. You already know my response to that—it does extend that far, as science can and does address unfalsifiable claims and readily discounts them with ease. It’s also important to note that his reasoning here is used to justify the distancing of skeptical groups from atheism from the NESS to the JREF. In that sense, there is a bit of schism, but it is nothing so major as to create overwhelming conflict. It’s mostly just a mild nuisance.
And I have to disagree with your last point, Flavin. Unbeguiled pointed out that someone can be a skeptic and be wrong about an issue in regards to theism—and in those cases both recognize the other as a committed scientifically minded person who has simply made an error. With that understanding, even a truther or antivaxxer could be considered a skeptic, provided they are in general committed to the scientific method and understand what it is—they are just wrong about one particular issue. So I’m only pointing out that with Unbeguiled’s standard of skepticism that allows theists in the club, even truthers and antivaxxers could be considered “real skeptics”.
Sure, you can point out that most theists who identify as scientific are likely the wish-washy sort, but not all science-accepting theists are wishy-washy—see Francis Collins, for instance. In fact, I’d argue that anyone who identifies specifically as a Christian is committed to so many problematic factual historical and empirical claims as a result that you very well could see them as those who “actively contradict facts and evidence in support of an ideology” in the same way the antivaxxers and truthers usually do.
But as a thought experiment, suppose James Randi (or your equivalent skeptical idol, Carl Sagan could just as easily do) believed everything he currently believes, was a fixture in the skeptical movement and immensely important to its development, and so on, but happened to believe in one silly thing: namely, that 9/11 was a government conspiracy. I doubt you’d then say he’s not a skeptic. You’d probably say he’s wrong about that one issue, but for the most part he’s a skeptic. That’s my only point. And I think we can all agree that if he tried to argue that the scope of skepticism should not extend to conspiracy theories, we’d laugh him out of the room. If only the same were true of religion!
Flavin
3 November, 2009 at 10:18 AM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
When Pigliucci uses the phrase “On the scope of skeptical inquiry” he is saying that you can’t use this one tool for everything. Sometimes you have to reach in to the toolbox and grab the philosophy pliers. He is not saying that the philosophy pliers are in a ghetto or that they should not be used, and he is not saying that problems requiring the use of the philosophy pliers cannot be taken on by those skilled in the skeptical spanner.
Yes, he is saying that purely unfalsifiable claims are not within the “scope” of science. But he is not saying that they are off limits. Just grab the pliers and get to work.
To quote, “I am most definitely not seeking to tell people what to write about and what to stay away from. Not only would that be futile, but it is contrary to the spirit of open inquiry that I hold as one of my highest ideals.”
Now, you disagree with his assertion that science cannot address unfalsifiable claims. You say, “…science can and does address unfalsifiable claims and readily discounts them with ease.” I challenge you to support that statement.
As a final note to this point, I agree that some specific groups may chose to ghettoize atheism, and I think it can be hypocritical of them to do so. But I do not think Pigliucci’s article, interpreted correctly, supports this idea.
————-
“So I’m only pointing out that with Unbeguiled’s standard of skepticism that allows theists in the club, even truthers and antivaxxers could be considered ‘real skeptics’.”
You’re being too glib with your use of the word “theist.” Just because UnB said some theists could be skeptics does not mean all theists could be skeptics. I defined what I meant by a theist who could be skeptically consistent, then you come back at me with this: “Sure, you can point out that most theists who identify as scientific are likely the wish-washy sort, but not all science-accepting theists are wishy-washy—see Francis Collins, for instance.” I would not count Francis Collins as a consistent skeptic. One can be a practicing scientist and a science-accepting theist but not be a “scientific skeptic,” by which I mean someone who applies the skeptical spanner to all aspects of his or her life.
Answering the question of whether or not a person’s beliefs fit into the definition of skepticism requires two things: 1. That we have some working definition of what skepticism actually means, 2. That we know very specifically what the beliefs in question are. Applying the boilerplate label “theism” doesn’t cut it in regards to criterion 2. (Side note: Pigliucci’s blog post was making a stab at criterion 1, but that’s the domain of the argument above.)
Some theists, under closer examination, might have a consistently skeptical view. Okay, cool with me. Most don’t. I think there’s an open question as to how theistic a person can be and still be considered a skeptic. And I tentatively agree that one cannot be a Christian and be a skeptic. Anyone who fits your analogy with truthers/antivaxxers is right out, so we can stop bringing them up.
And I think addressing your thought experiment might require a trifucation, so I’ll leave that alone for now.
Flavin
10 November, 2009 at 12:27 AM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
\tap_the_mic
Hey, is this thing on?
UnBeguiled
12 November, 2009 at 7:35 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
St. Gas wrote:
“In the end I think that what you ultimately do believe has to come into play in some fashion when identifying someoen as a skeptic”
Yes, in some fashion. But it is why you believe that matters. I wrote:
“A skeptic is a person committed to a method, not a person who accepts or rejects some laundry list of claims.”
Do you agree with that or not?
If you don’t, then it seems to me you are committing “skeptics” to dogmatism, which is to bastardize skepticism.
F
20 November, 2009 at 9:53 PM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
Consider emphasis on “You”.
Double emphasis on “Believe”. That’s the kicker.
ronmurp
24 February, 2010 at 5:22 AM (UTC -6) Link to this comment
Many, if not most, atheists accept the label ‘Atheist’ as the nearest convenient label that describes their position regarding religion, which is pretty much the same as that of many, if not most, skeptics. An atheist will use the label when being specifically sceptical about the origins of the universe and the interventions of any external agent – and for clarity may express it as ‘A-theist’ to emphasise the lack of commitment to theism, rather than an absolute claim to there being no deity. The label ‘Agnostic’ doesn’t go quite far enough and gives religion more credibility than this particular brand of skeptic thinks is due. I use the label ‘Atheist’ for myself when discussing theism, but ‘Skeptic’ when discussing other flaky claims. Even ardent atheists like Richard Dawkins express a similar view. I’d also expect that most people who label themselves as sceptics would appreciate this, so what’s the big deal?